The historian William Hexter has contrasted the nature of knowing and communicating by use of a baseball metaphor (1968) . During his long career Willie Mays proved that he "knew" baseball. His knowledge was compounded of inherited skill and learned experience. The reality of his knowledge was visibly communicated to baseball fans and is still demonstrable statistically in baseball record books. The knowledge itself, however, was not communicated, and its nature remains a mystery.
Similarly, it is much easier to demonstrate the fact of scientific knowledge than it is to communicate the essence of that knowledge. Complex integrated concepts and skills must be communicated primarily through verbal symbols. Unfortunately, the acquisition of knowledge does not automatically engender skill in communicating it. The difference between knowledge and communication is a stark fact of scientific life that becomes painfully apparent to fledgling scientists as they begin to write their dissertations. As scientific observations and experiments are performed the committed mind becomes assimilated into the work. The emotional wash resulting from the empathy of researchers for their problem is one of the chief rewards of science. But the adrenalin high of the young researcher plunges into depression and hangover as the doing and knowing phase of November 1975 James L. Gooch research passes into the codifying and writing stage. This, not the research itself, is the rite of passage of the adolescent biologist, and, like lionkilling by the Masai warrior, it never really becomes easy with practice.
The barrier between knowing and communicating cannot be breached entirely. The physicist and philosopher Michael Polanyi writes about our "tacit knowledge" of things, which is always greater than what we can say (1958) . He describes tacit knowledge as inarticulate, ineffable, unspecifiable. Most of us could recognize the face of a friend from a thousand similar faces, but communicating the minutely distinguishing cues to another person would be almost impossible. In the same way, we all possess a substratum of genuine but inarticulate knowledge about our disciplines laid down as the accumulation of intimate experience.
Nevertheless, the cumulative gains in scientific knowledge since the 17th century prove that subtle and abstruse information is communicated. The struggle to translate perceived elements of external phenomena into linear written communication gives scientific rhetoric its character. The word rhetoric connotes empty, bombastic oratory to some, but its primary meaning, citing Hexter (1968) again, is "the organization of language appropriate to that particular kind of communication which is relevant to a particular activity." More succinctly, rhetoric is the means proper to the ends of communication.
We are rarely conscious of the rhetorical style of the scientific papers we read, although we have no trouble discerning those that are faultily written. What are some of the characteristics of scientific rhetoric? My approach to this topic will be that of a working biologist, not that of a literary critic or analytical philosopher. Foremost, scientific rhetoric is prose with a purpose: the medium is not the message. The purpose (teleology, unlike in scientific concepts, is indispensable in scientific rhetoric) is description and exposition tailored to fashion the greatest possible correspondence between what is known and what is stated. Personal style is subordinated to efficient communication; ideally, the writing conforms to Jacques Barzun's (1959) definition of good prose, that it acts as a transparent medium by which ideas are conveyed without distortion. Two steps intervene for the scientist between the experiment and the finished paper. First is the process of groping for verbal or graphic symbols that depict knowledge that has been tacit and intuitive. This step is private and scarcely available for analysis, but is nonetheless real. Second is the grammatical, syntactical, and logical organization of these symbols into effective written scientific rhetoric. This step is public and amenable to description.
A first aspect of the latter concerns word usage. Since biologists do not yet write their papers in mathematical or symbolic logic notation, it is crucial that words speak unambiguously. The words in the scientist's lexicon have ideally conformed to the 19th century concept of atoms: sharp-edged and indivisible units combinable in stoichiometric proportions according to fixed rules. Words should denote and not connote. A denotative word rings true and says what it means. A connotative word implies, suggests, insinuates, but does not say anything flatly. Most words for value-neutral things are denotative, and those with emotional or value content are usually connotative. Often a word takes its denotation or connotation from the style or context. However, some words are so powerfully connotative and variously interpreted by generations of theologians and philosophers that they have become almost unfit for use in scientific rhetoric. George Boas (1965) gives unity, eternity, immuta b i lity, progress, and vitality as examples.
The case for precise denotation does not necessarily carry over into the thinking that precedes writing. Paul Goodman (1971) comments that too exact word definition may precondition and limit the range of what is thought and said. The resonant and plastic properties of words are probably helpful in the initial step of depicting tacit knowledge symbolically. It would seem that the creative and innovative face of science derives in part from the manysidedness of words, whereas the communicative face depends on their sharp denotation. Scientists need to be able to think polyphonically but to write monodically.
Like expository prose in general, scientific rhetoric aims at precision and literalness in its statements. It relies on exact naming rather than metaphor, explanation rather than vivid imagery, and logical consistency rather than plausibility. Rhyme, accent, alliteration, and other metrical devices, which typify most early written languages, are excluded from scientific prose perhaps because they divert attention from the message to the style and because they restrict word choice, exacerbating all the more the problems of transforming knowledge into communication. It is perhaps significant that ancient Greek literature was written in verse until the Ionian philosophers broke with tradition and composed most of the earliest cosmologies in prose (Humphreys 1975) .
Two modes of explication, the dialectical and the eristical, are found combined in expository prose (Tomlin 1973) . Dialectical writing is non-emo-. tive and appeals to reason and logic; eristical writing appeals to sentiment 716 and prejudice and seeks "not truth but victory." The ideal prose according to Tomlin strikes an eqUilibrium between the dialectical element, which forges the continuous chain of reasoning, and the eristical element, which injects emotive energy into the argument. Scientific rhetoric is strongly dialectical; eristical writing, unless it is very subtle, is unacceptable. Particularly forbidden are attempts to impugn the character or motives of scientists who hold viewpoints contrary to our own. Whatever we really think, we adhere to the code that enjoins that our intellectual opponent is rational, reasonable, and is more interested in the truth of the facts or interpretations at issue than in gaining victory. In book reviews and letters to the editor, the standards against eristic are lowered a little.
Scientific rhetoric avoids the use of eristic partly through the muting of the ego. Scientific accounts often read as if the experiments had performed themselves causelessly. An abstention from "I" gives the false impression that the researcher is emotionally detached from his or her work. This may be the origin of the popular conception of the austere and intellectually cold scientist, which was current at least until James Watson published The Double Helix (1968). Adding to this impression is the fact that in scientific rhetoric there is no popularization or concession to the uninformed reader, nor are discursive statements made. As Charlton Laird observed (1970), a conscious attempt to "interest" the reader is regarded by scholars as unprofessional and in bad taste. The import of the dialectical style, emotional neutrality, and uncompromising rigor of scientific rhetoric is tha t i t enhances the intellectual authority of the scientific enterprise. There is also a price to be paid; consisting of the sacrifice of the approachability, readibility, and forward impetus that egocentric and eristical writing possesses.
Deliberate use of metaphor and analogy is rare in scientific rhetoric. Metaphors are regarded as distracting verbal conceits, which intrude the writer's ego into the otherwise objective presentation of the thesis. The principle of analogy depends on the discovery of a structural or functional likeness between seemingly disparate objects or states. Arthur Koestler (1964) argued that scientific creativity rests primarily on the ability to perceive. such like~ nesses. It is probable that analogical thinking, like the sympathy for the connotations of words, is helpful in transforming tacit knowledge into verbal communication. As a rhetorical device, however, analogical reasoning is distrusted by scientists. Because intellectual history is so cluttered with philosophical and idealogical systems based on plausible but spurious analogy, it is not surprising that scientists prefer to rely on empirically established data and logical analysis.
Nevertheless, metaphor and analogy do enter into scientific rhetoric through the back door via the influence of currently reigning economic, political, or scien tific paradigms. Rose and Rose (1973) cite as an example the metaphor of the "cell economy," current during the period of pre-Keynesian economics and up until the 1950's. The cell was depicted as a miniature capitalist economic unit exchanging goods and services with its neighbors, depositing and withdrawing energy currency in the form of ATP, and serving its internal production and consumer constituencies by means of energy flow. Today the master metaphors in biology are drawn from cybernetics, information theory, and managerial economics. Molecular biology employs transcription and translation, end product inhibition and regulator gene; environmental biology uses resource utilization (for food selection), competition and exploitation, and a definition of species diversity in terms of the number of bits of information. It is obvious that the scientific literature will never be entirely purged of metaphor and analogy unless scientists utterly divorce themselves from their surrounding culture.
Many critics of scientific rhetoric complain about the excessive use of jargon. Jargon is said to have the sole purpose of binding together an exclusive group, like Rosicrucians exchanging signals of recognition. Divest scientific prose of jargon, these critics say, and it becomes thin and unprepossessing stuff. I contend that this viewpoint is uninformed because most of the offending terms that do pass into use are neologisms that were created to stand for things and concepts that are simply unrecognized in the general corpus of the language. Surely it is better to mint new words for new ideas than to preempt old ones. The latter is a damnable practice because uninitiated readers mistranslate the word unknowingly, whereas they re.cognize a neologism for what it is and make allowances.
At the present time neologisms continue to enter every field of biology . When discoveries are made leisurely there is always time to devise suitable neo-Greek terms. However, during the hectic rush of discoveries in molecular genetics during the 1950's and 1960's, there was not quite enough Greek to go around. Some inelegant but vivid survivors of that era include: nonsense mutation, leaky mutant, nicked DNA, rolling circle replication, and, in the materials and methods section of one paper, squeezate. Meanwhile, some older terms lose their precision and gradually drop out of circulation: protoplasm, chromatin, microbe, sere.
At its best scientific rhetoric is an efficient and economical mode of communication. Unfortunately, these traits disappear from the prose of scientists turned administrators. As a part of their new duties, they learn to write and perhaps to think in a technological variant of officialese or gobbledegook, a particularly insipid and debased style that has drawn much fire from language purists (e.g., Barzun 1959 , Gowers 1962 , Muller 1970 , Orwell 1946 . Quoted below is a sentence from a publication of the 1960's devoted to the facilitation of communication among scientists and engineers:
Fulfilling the assigned tasks of broadly surveying the complex interrelationship of federal and privately operated information activities and of considering the most effective intellectual, economic, and technological means of increasing the efficiency of information transfer and use has required the full three ye a rs allotted the Committee.
Like scientific prose this mode of writing is full of abstract and collective nouns, : and it has the advantage of using few unfamiliar terms. Nevertheless, it is distinctly inferior to scientific rhetoric. It is vague, pretentious, and lacks for\Vardmovement. The last quality is something of a feat, since the English language has a natural rhythmic impetus inherited from its Anglo-Saxon ancestor. Reading such prose is like opening Chiriese boxes-within-boxes until the disappointingly small specimen of thought is extracted. It is fit only as an exercise for 'speed-reading addicts.
I have belabored technological officialese because it represents the direction in which scientific writing may turn in the future. In many, respects scien tific rhetoric stands equidistant November 1975 from the connotative style of imaginative literature and the hippopotamus ballet of officialese. Its present position has come about through change and evolution : Pythagorean geometry was incorporated into mystical texts, scientific works were often cast in dialogue form during the 17th century, and as recently as the late 19th century scientific prose conformed to generally accepted literary models. There is no compelling evidence that it has found its permanent form or that it has selfcorrecting mechanisms for excesses. It could drift toward one of the alternative rhetorics. Given the present antipathy between the two cultures and the manifest inappropriateness of connotative rhetoric for the purposes of scientific communication, drift, if it occurs, will probably be in the direction of officialese. Such a trend can only be reinforced by the increasing number of scientists who assume positions as administrators and managers in government, industry, and academic institutions. Thus far, however, it has been the social sciences rather than the natural sciences that have gradually aquired an inflated rhetoric.
For the purposes of overcoming the barrier between what is known and what can be communicated, scientific rhetoric has been extraordinarily successful. To serve that function exclusively it has spurned casual readibility and stylistic adornment. Officialese is insidious because it has the air of sententiousness and objectivity, whereas it actually narcotizes thought and blurs communication. One could visualize a flourishing science of the future producing a voluminous literature in impeccable mandarin-officialese, but it would not be a science in which there was much creative thinking or communication. As unlovely as it is in print, it might repay young scientists to study and respect the rhetoric in which they are destined to formulate and communicate their professional ideas during the rest of their lives.
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